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CESifo Economic Studies Advance Access originally published online on February 20, 2008
CESifo Economic Studies 2008 54(1):1-21; doi:10.1093/cesifo/ifn001
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Right arrow I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Partnership Penalties and Bonuses Created by UK Welfare Programs

Dan Anderberg*, Florence Kondylis{dagger} and Ian Walker{ddagger}

*Royal Holloway University of London, CEPR, CESifo and IFS, e-mail: Dan.Anderberg{at}rhul.ac.uk.
{dagger}Royal Holloway University of London and CEP.
{ddagger}University of Warwick, IFS and IZA.

This article explores how the UK welfare benefit system subsidise or penalise couples for living together as partners. A couple is said to face a "partnership bonus" ("penalty") if they can receive more (less) benefits when living as partners than when living separately. Using data on existing couples from the Family Resources Survey 1995–2004 we provide a description of the distribution of partnership penalties and bonuses in the population. We also find that, while the 1999 Working Families' Tax Credit reform improved the financial incentives for partnership formation, this effect was largely undone by the subsequent 2003 Working Tax Credit reform. (JEL codes: H31, I38, J12)

Key Words: Family structure • welfare benefits


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