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CESifo Economic Studies 2009 55(1):1-14; doi:10.1093/cesifo/ifp002
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

This article appears in the following CESifo Economic Studies issue: Reinventing Europe [View the issue table of contents]

Reinventing Europe: Introduction

Massimo Bordignon*, Thiess Buettner{dagger} and Frederick van der Ploeg{ddagger}

* Catholic University of Milan, Large Gemelli 1, 20123 Milano, Italy. Also affiliated with CESifo. Email: massimo.bordignon{at}unicatt.it.
{dagger} Ifo Institute, Poschingerstr. 5, 81679, Munich, Germany. Also affiliated with CESifo. Email: buettner{at}ifo.de
{ddagger} Manor Road Building, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK. Also affiliated with the University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, CESifo, and CEPR. Email: rick.vanderploeg{at}economics.ox.ac.uk.

Given the enlargement of the European Union, the fall-back in productivity growth and the lack of success in implementing further structural reforms, this special issue highlights the political economy in the European Union and discusses the role of the Maastricht Treaty as an impediment or a catalyst for reform. It also sheds light on the empirical characteristics of the voting behaviour of Members of the European Parliament and shows that they vote more along party lines than national lines and pays due attention to allegiance and party discipline. It offers a game-theoretic analysis of why the Lisbon Treaty will not strengthen the European Parliament versus the Council as much as expected and how the old bigger Member States strengthen their grip on the political decision-making process. There is discussion of the ratification of European legislation in the Member States. Finally, the crucial question of how European politics can be made more attractive is addressed. (JEL codes: F55, H11, P16)

Key Words: European Union • voting • ideology • party discipline • allegiance • budget approval • legislation • political economy • structural reform • fiscal rules • subsidiarity • institutional reform


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