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CESifo Economic Studies Advance Access originally published online on December 17, 2008
CESifo Economic Studies 2009 55(1):197-232; doi:10.1093/cesifo/ifn033
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

This article appears in the following CESifo Economic Studies issue: Reinventing Europe [View the issue table of contents]

The European Union and the Member States: An Empirical Analysis of Europeans’ Preferences for Competences Allocation

Floriana Cerniglia* and Laura Pagani{dagger}

* Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università di Milano Bicocca, Milan, Italy. E-mail: floriana.cerniglia{at}unimib.it.
{dagger} Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università di Milano Bicocca, Milan, Italy. E-mail: laura.pagani{at}unimib.it.

In this article, we empirically study the preferences of European citizens concerning the allocation of powers between the European Union (EU) and the Member States using Eurobarometer data from 1995 to 2003. Both descriptive and econometric analysis highlights a ranking of countries according to the number of issues citizens want to delegate to EU (which we call Europeanism). More specifically, the more pro-European countries are those from Southern Europe while the less pro-European countries are those in Scandinavia, Denmark, and Luxemburg. Econometric analysis shows that this country effect is largely linked to the quality of the countries’ national government institutions. We find also a positive relationship between Europeanism and education, the degree of information of citizens, and left wing affiliation. For some policy domains, we also estimate probit equations for citizens’ preferred allocation of powers and we find that the countries’ Europeanism ranking varies with the area considered. (JEL codes: H11, H77)

Key Words: European Union • fiscal federalism


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