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CESifo Economic Studies Advance Access originally published online on April 6, 2009
CESifo Economic Studies 2009 55(2):286-305; doi:10.1093/cesifo/ifp009
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction

Shurojit Chatterji* and Sayantan Ghosal{dagger}

* School of Economics, Singapore Management University, e-mail: shurojitc{at}smu.edu.sg
{dagger} Department of Economics, University of Warwick, e-mail: s.ghosal{at}warwick.ac.uk

In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time. (JEL codes: Q54, F53, Q50)

Key Words: Climate • global • negotiations • unilateralism • technology • cumulative • emissions • reduction


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