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CESifo Economic Studies 2009 55(1):15-29; doi:10.1093/cesifo/ifn040
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

This article appears in the following CESifo Economic Studies issue: Reinventing Europe [View the issue table of contents]

Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament

Gérard Roland*

* Economics Department, 627 Evans Hall #3880, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880, USA. e-mail: groland{at}econ.berkeley.edu

This article summarizes research on the analysis of roll call votes in the European Parliament since the European Parliament was elected by universal suffrage and draws lessons about legislative behavior in the European Parliament. The research shows that voting in the European Parliament occurs along supranational party lines and not along geographical lines. Party cohesion has increased with the powers of the European Parliament. This increased cohesion is the reflection of European party discipline based on cohesion of national party groups. Moreover, coalition frequency is related mostly to ideological closeness between party groups. (JEL codes: D72, F53, P 16)

Key Words: European Parliament • legislative behavior • roll call votes • coalition formation • party discipline


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