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<title>CESifo Economic Studies - current issue</title>
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<prism:eIssn>1612-7501</prism:eIssn>
<prism:coverDisplayDate>March 2008</prism:coverDisplayDate>
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<title><![CDATA[Partnership Penalties and Bonuses Created by UK Welfare Programs]]></title>
<link>http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/54/1/1?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article explores how the UK welfare benefit system subsidise or penalise couples for living together as partners. A couple is said to face a "partnership bonus" ("penalty") if they can receive more (less) benefits when living as partners than when living separately. Using data on existing couples from the Family Resources Survey 1995&ndash;2004 we provide a description of the distribution of partnership penalties and bonuses in the population. We also find that, while the 1999 Working Families' Tax Credit reform improved the financial incentives for partnership formation, this effect was largely undone by the subsequent 2003 Working Tax Credit reform. (JEL codes: H31, I38, J12)</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anderberg, D., Kondylis, F., Walker, I.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-29</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[H31 - Household, I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs, J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/cesifo/ifn001</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Partnership Penalties and Bonuses Created by UK Welfare Programs]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CESifo Group</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>54</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>21</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/54/1/22?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Pro-social Motivation and the Delivery of Social Services]]></title>
<link>http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/54/1/22?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article provides an overview highlighting some major themes of the recent literature on the role of pro-social motivation in the provision of social services. We focus on the insights obtained from two alternative ways of modelling pro-social motivation; action-oriented and output-oriented altruism. This literature has implications regarding the design of optimal incentives, the selection of motivated agents and its interaction with monetary rewards, and the optimal organizational form required to exploit such motivations. We also discuss the implications for government provision of social services from the perspective of a parallel literature that emphasizes the non-contractible nature of output, and contrast it with the implications derived from work emphasizing the role of pro-social motivation. (JEL codes: H11, J32, J45, L31, L33)</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Francois, P., Vlassopoulos, M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-29</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government, J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Private Pensions, J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets, L31 - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs, L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises; Privatization; Contracting Out]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/cesifo/ifn002</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Pro-social Motivation and the Delivery of Social Services]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CESifo Group</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>54</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>54</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>22</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/54/1/55?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Grey New World: Europe on the Road to Gerontocracy?]]></title>
<link>http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/54/1/55?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>Higher life expectancy and feminization of work have changed the life course. These developments require changes in the way society organizes work and accumulates and maintains human capital over the life cycle. This paper describes various reforms aimed at preventing Europe from becoming a gerontocracy. It also discusses the political challenges associated with reforms aimed at lengthening the working life and protecting fertility. (JEL code: J1)</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bovenberg, A. L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-29</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[J10 - General]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/cesifo/ifn005</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Grey New World: Europe on the Road to Gerontocracy?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CESifo Group</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>54</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>72</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>55</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/54/1/73?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Does a Simpler Income Tax Yield More Equity and Efficiency?]]></title>
<link>http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/54/1/73?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[
<p>This article investigates the impact of tax simplification on various indicators of the efficiency of the tax system and on the distribution of income. The analysis is based on a simulation model (FiFoSiM) using German income tax and household survey microdata. We model tax simplification as the abolition of a set of deductions from the income tax base. We find that this form of tax base simplification leads to a reduction in the use of professional tax advice, a more equitable income distribution and an increase in tax revenue. If this is combined with a reduction of income tax rates to preserve revenue neutrality, the effects depend on the type of rate schedule adjustment. The combination with a flat rate tax increases income inequality at the expense of the middle class, but it also leads to efficiency gains because tax distortions of labour supply are reduced. The combination with a rate schedule adjustment, which preserves the directly progressive schedule reduces inequality but increases overall tax distortions. We conclude that the effects of tax base simplification on after tax income inequality and tax distortions mainly depend on the type of tax schedule adjustment. (JEL Codes: D3, H2, J22)</p>
]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Fuest, C., Peichl, A., Schaefer, T.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>2008-02-29</dc:date>
<dc:subject><![CDATA[D30 - General, H20 - General, J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply]]></dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1093/cesifo/ifn003</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Does a Simpler Income Tax Yield More Equity and Efficiency?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>CESifo Group</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>54</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>97</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2008-03-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>73</prism:startingPage>
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